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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
RICHARDS C. LEDFORS, DEBORAH 
LEDFORS, individually and as 
Guardians Ad Litem on behalf 
of their minor son, RICHARD 
TODD LEDFORS, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
EMERY COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
BRENT ARNOLD and THOMAS BURR, 
individually and as employees 
of Emery County School 
District, and BRETT PAYNE and 
BERT W. SPARKS, individually, 
and JOHN DOES I through V. 
Defendants-Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this matter is in the Utah Supreme 
Court under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the negligence claim brought against the Emery 
County School District was properly dismissed on governmental 
immunity grounds because the injury "arises out of [a] 
battery " Utah Code Ann. $ 63-30-10(1)(b) (1986) (amended 
1990). This Court reviews the decision below for correctness, 
giving "no deference to the trial court's view of the law." Ron 
Case Roofing & Asphalt v. Bloomcruist. 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). 
: Case No. 900503 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit. 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all 
governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury which 
results from the exercise of a governmental function, 
governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or other 
governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, 
nursing, or other professional health care clinical training 
program conducted in either public or private facilities. 
The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and 
the construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm 
systems by governmental entities are considered to be 
governmental functions, and governmental entities and their 
officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or 
damage resulting from those activities. 
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act 
or omission of employee-Exceptions-Waiver for injury 
caused by violation of fourth amendment rights 
[Effective until July 1,1990]. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived 
for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of 
an employee committed within the scope of employment except if 
the injury: . . . 
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, 
false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse 
of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract 
rights, infliction of mental anguish, or civil rights; or . . . 
(g) arises out of or results from riots, unlawful 
assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence, and civil 
disturbances; or . . . 
(j) arises out of the incarceration of any person in 
any state prison, county, or city jail or other place of legal 
confinement; . . . 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case involves a negligence claim against the Emery 
County School District (the District) and employees Brent Arnold 
and Thomas Burr for their alleged failure to supervise students 
attending a gym class at Emery County High School. The alleged 
negligence is claimed to have proximately caused injuries to 
Richard Ledfors who was beaten by classmates Brett Payne and Bert 
W. Sparks. Payne and Sparks are not parties to this appeal, but 
have been sued by Ledfors in the proceeding below for the 
intentional tort of battery. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
The District moved to dismiss on the ground that 
Ledfors' injury "arises out of" a battery. Utah Code Ann. § 63-
30-10(1)(b) (1986) (amended 1990). Defendants Brent Arnold and 
Thomas Burr, employees of the District, separately moved to 
dismiss on the ground that they are immune pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. S 63-30-4(3)(4) (1986). The Seventh District Court, 
Honorable Boyd Bunnell presiding, converted the motions to ones 
for summary judgment and granted them. Ledfors' appeal from the 
trial court's decision was originally dismissed by this Court for 
lack of jurisdiction, there being no final order under Rule 54, 
Utah R. Civ. P. The trial court later certified its decision as 
final, and this appeal ensued. Although Ledfors' docketing 
statement indicates that an issue on appeal is whether the 
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dismissal as to Arnold and Burr is proper, Ledfors fails to 
address this question in the brief. Therefore, this appeal is 
only as to the dismissal of the District from the action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from a motion to dismiss that was 
converted to a motion for summary judgment. A review of such 
requires facts to be viewed in the light most favorable to 
appellant. Ron Case Roofing, 773 P.2d at 1385. Since the only 
facts before the trial court were those alleged in the complaint, 
and no facts outside the pleadings were offered, the allegations 
of the complaint constitute the facts for purposes of this 
appeal. The facts from the complaint are as follows: 
1) On February 22, 1989, while participating in his 
physical education class at Emery County High School, Ledfors and 
his classmates were left unsupervised by teacher Thomas Burr. 
(R. 2, 3, and 4). 
2) While Ledfors was participating in class activities, 
Payne and Sparks, who were apparently roaming the halls 
unsupervised, entered the gym and physically struck Ledfors. 
(R- 3, 4) 
3) No teacher or other employee of the District stopped 
the incident. (R. 4) 
4) Ledfors had reported prior incidents involving Payne 
and Sparks to Emery County High School Principal Brent Arnold, 
4 
and had been assured by him that the problem would be remedied. 
(R. 4) 
5) During the incident, Ledfors sustained injuries to 
his head, abdomen and back for which his parents have and 
continue to incur medical expenses. (R. 4, 5, 7) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Emery County School District (the District) is 
immune from Ledfors' claim pursuant to Utah Code Ann. SS 63-30-3 
(1986), 63-30-10(l)(b) (1986) (amended 1990). These provisions 
immunize a governmental entity in its exercise of a governmental 
function, and preserve that immunity in negligence actions if the 
alleged injury arises out of a battery. In this case, Ledfors 
commenced a negligence action against the District for injuries 
arising from a battery. The alleged negligent act involves the 
exercise of a governmental function. The District is therefore 
immune, and the action against it was properly dismissed. 
Ledfors incorrectly contends that the District was not 
exercising a governmental function anc that the District is not 
immunized from a claim for an injury caused by a battery. Utah 
constitutional, common, and statutory law, as well as applicable 
law of sister jurisdictions, demonstrate that in teaching and 
supervising students the District engages in a governmental 
function. Additionally, the plain language of S 63-30-10(1)(b) 
and relevant case law demonstrate that the District is immune 
since Ledfors' injury "arises out of [a] battery. . . . " § 63-
5 
30-10(1)(b). Ledfors' interpretation of the statute is based on 
inapplicable case law and it contradicts basic rules of statutory 
construction. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY GRANTED THE DISTRICT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS IN RULING THAT IT IS IMMUNE 
FROM SUIT PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. S 63-30-
10(l)(b) (1986) (amended 1990) 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act grants immunity to 
governmental entities in their exercise of governmental 
functions. Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-3 (1986). There is a three 
step approach to determining whether this immunity is applicable 
in a specific setting. See Maddocks v. Salt Lake City Corp., 740 
P.2d 1337, 1340 (Utah 1987). The first step is to decide whether 
the activity performed by the entity is a governmental function. 
If the activity is a governmental function, the entity is immune. 
S 63-30-10; Williams v. Carbon County Bd. of Educ, 780 P.2d 
816, 818 (Utah 1989). The second step requires a determination 
of whether there is a waiver of immunity. If such a waiver 
exists, the third step involves a determination regarding any 
exceptions to the waiver. Ledfors focuses on steps one and 
three, contending that the District was not engaged in a 
governmental function when the alleged negligence took place,1 
1
 This issue is raised for the first time on appeal. At 
the trial level, Ledfors made one reference to the issue of 
whether the school district was engaged in a governmental 
function. On page 4 of plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss it is stated, "[p]laintiffs shall 
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10 {J HI lb ) . 
A, The District Engages in a "Governmental Function" 
:li i i the Supervi sion and Education of Students 
overnmental Immur . tv Ai i ' e- IF governmental 
orf'^ies in i 
1986). , i Standiford v. Salt Lake u i 
605 F 2d ; -.*i defined * "governmental 
r 
e a S e l . ^ a t l u > It I V l U e S I d . <a * 
.:.. -legislature has def^r»H - »uei*Laj. luauiiua a&i 
[A]ny act, failure to act, operation, 
function, or undertaking of a governmental 
entity whether or not the act, failure to 
act, operation, function, or undertaking is 
characterized as a governmental, proprietary, 
a core governmental function, unique to 
government, undertaken in a dual capacity, 
essential to or not essential to a government: 
3r governmental function, or could be 
performed by private enterprise or priva tie 
persons. 
assume, in arguendo, and for purposes of this Motion onl> i ! I 
the operation of a school is a governmental function All I -ugh 
the District asserted at the trial court that it was engaged in a 
governmental function, Ledfors did not dispute the claim or raise 
the issue other than in the scant reference above. In Park City 
Utah Corp. v. Ensign Comp,, 586 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1978), this 
Court stated that " [w]here a party neither raises an issue in its 
pleadings nor presents it to the trial court, the issue cannot be 
considered for the first time on appeal." See also Wagner v. 
Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 366, 482 P.2d 702, 705 (1971). Ledfors' mere 
reference to an issue "in arguendo" is not sufficient to preserve 
it for appeal. Therefore, this Court should not consider the 
governmental function issue. The District presents argument on 
this question only out of caution for its interest in this 
appeal. 
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Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-2(4)(a) (Supp 1987). In the present case, 
Utah's constitutional, common and statutory laws, as well as 
those of sister jurisdictions, demonstrate that teaching and 
supervising students are governmental functions. 
The tasks of educating and supervising students are 
governmental functions within Standiford. The Constitution of 
the State of Utah requires "the establishment and maintenance of 
a public education system which shall be open to all children of 
the State." Utah Const, art. X, § 1. Teaching and supervising 
students are acts essential to the operation of that system. 
Such tasks are, therefore, essential to the core governmental 
activity of maintaining a public education system for children. 
They are governmental functions. 
The tasks of educating and supervising students are 
governmental functions according to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
2(4)(a) (Supp. 1988). The statute defines a governmental 
function as "any act. . . of a governmental entity. . . . " Id. 
Educating and supervising students are acts of a governmental 
entity and are therefore governmental functions. 
Utah's constitutional, common and statutory law are not 
alone in demonstrating that teaching and supervising students are 
governmental functions. A similar conclusion has been made in 
other jurisdictions that define "governmental function" in a 
manner similar to that in Standiford. The Standiford court 
relied on the decisions of the Michigan courts. Id. at 1236. In 
Michigan, the operation of a public school system is an immune 
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governmental function The Michigan Court of Appeals lie 
Deaner v. Utica Community School Dist., 9(> .Mich. Ap| M M , 
i ic;) iritiinj s u p e r v i s i n g *i 
s t l i n g c l a s s i s an immune g o v e n rnientaJ furictlcni The Deaner 
_ _ s t a t e d : 
The government plays a pervasive role in the 
area of educationf appropriating substantial 
state funds to that field and declaring 
education as a public policy. (Citation 
omitted). The number of private schools is 
inadequate to meet the education needs of the 
public. Finally, while private schools exist 
to educate some students, the provision of a 
free and universal education is a uniquely 
governmental function. Therefore, we would 
find that the trial court was correct in 
granting summary judgement to the school 
district based ~~ governmental immunity. 
Id. at 628, 
it In i III in in II.I in i i luiiJ-i (-in- in a c c o r d wnnii Michigan T 
j u r i s d i c t i o n s , which have a s i m i l a r common liiw d e f i n i t i o n of a 
gove rnmen t a.1 f unet i on , a l s o liu 11! I liii I niii.i nil it i in i ini MIM I m. pe i u I. .1 mi 
),. 1I1-1. 1 bi:h\jo I .1 I-.I an immune govt I u I. 1 u n c t i o n , f o r e x a m p l e , 
t h e Oklahoma Supreme Court, he-Id t h a t t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of p u b l i c 
s choo l bui l .d i .nqs I s esspifl \l I II r qiAiei iniu/hl ,••• p u r p o s e o l 
eiliiLd!. i...ng c h i l d r e n , Mi I son v . G i p s o n , 753 V .'Id 1349, 1355 (Okla. 
1 9 8 8 ) , The New York Court of A p p e a l s r e a c h e d *i n n i i M r 'recruit in 
Bonner v . C i t y of new York, hi ' i r 1 " >: \u\ ' U 1 1 1 v "'I H(i, M6 
N .E .2d 114 7 II "In 1,19 8 4 ; , it, h e l d thai , p r o v i d i n g s e c u r i t y i n 
p u b l i c s c h o o l s I s a governmental f u n c t i o n . nLm 1 
The o p e r a t i o n vx p u b l i c s c h o o l s i s a l s o an immune 
governmenta l f u n c t i o n i n T e x a s . See Duson v . Midland County 
Indep. S c h o o l D i s t . » 627 S.W.2d 4 2 8 , 429 (Tex. Ct App. 1981) 
Ledfors misstates Pichette v. Manistigue Public 
Schools, 403 Mich. 268, 269 N.W.2d 143 (1978) as authority for 
the principle that supervising public school students is not a 
governmental function. Pichette was a negligence action brought 
for the injuries of a child who was injured while playing on an 
unsupervised playground after school hours. Id. at 145. It is 
therefore distinguishable from this case because this case 
concerns acts in an educational classroom setting whereas 
Pichette involved a recreational setting. Moreover, Justice 
Fitzgerald, writing for the seven member court, failed in 
Pichette to persuade the majority that the operation of the 
school playground was not a governmental function. Id. at 150, 
152. Four Justices, concurring and dissenting separately, failed 
to join Justice Fitzgerald on the governmental function issue. 
Three Justices would have held that the school was engaged in a 
governmental function, and the remaining Justice stated that 
since the case could be disposed of on other grounds, there was 
no need to reach the issue. Id. at 150, 152. Therefore, 
Pichette does not support Ledfors' position. If anything, it 
indicates that a majority of the Michigan Supreme Court views 
supervising students as a governmental function. Finally, the 
language appellant quotes from Pichette is taken from the 
(furnishing and maintaining playground equipment for the use of 
school children is a governmental function). See also Gravely v. 
Lewisville Indep. School Dist., 701 S.W.2d 956, 958 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1986) (maintenance of gymnasium bleachers is a governmental 
function); Stout v. Grand Prairie Indep. School Dist., 733 S.W.2d 
290, 296 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (supervision of students during 
cheerleading practice is a governmental function). 
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dissenting opinion in Thomas v, State Highway Dept., 398 Mich , 
h
^ w 2d 5« S^a 1976), and as such i" not porsuaaj u 
M i i In i i| i ii « mi I ill i 1.1 B i c h e t t e lidvt« i . o n s x s t e n t J \ In I I 
that supervising and teaching si U lents is a governmental function 
an 1 I mi h immune fioiii finii bee Weavei v. Dull Norton cu. 
M l Apr 2Wi. \M I in, " i finm, supervision of 
vocational i. 1 cation students is d government a m function entitled 
to immunity): Brosnan v Ijivoniu Public bchuolu, I! I M M II l\\>\\ 
" ">J 1 ?«P
 ( ?91 (19P1) ( operation of a public school 
speech therapy program is a governmental function even thnuqh 
private sector run ,« in i n il I I i lui i n h, i i«i nnj i HM h a program); 
Gr dmes v. King, J M Mi^h. App- 5 7 i
 r 332 N W 2d 615, ulP |L 9 8 3 ) , 
(supervision oi girls locker room following extracurricular 
baskel'»-i i I' |>^»qrriin wds « , 'v LJJ luncLiun). 1 
The Jaws of HI ruh and bistei jurisdictions demonstrate 
that teaching and supervi sinq sf udeiiI r >in• qi nn• > nmenI »il 
J n m 1 inn.1:.. In I In* pi'eSi id ^,
 f I lu iieglj qence attributed to the 
District Involves those exact activitii"i Ledfors was allegedly 
injured durin :] n physic r»' IHIM'1^ i > I m p i | Oie 
iiiis Li, n.jrtoi & alleged negligent .supervision of the cla i . , 
Therefore, the conduct of Ledfors" class and supervision 
classmates are governmental lunrl.io 
None of these cases hold that tu be ^nyriqed in a 
governmental function a .school must be teaihing d uouj.be required 
by state law. 
B. Ledfors' Injury Arises Out of a Battery, So His 
Claim is Barred by Utah Code Ann- S 63-30-10(1)(b) 
(1986) (amended 1990) 
Step two in the governmental immunity analysis requires 
a determination of whether immunity under § 63-30-3 has been 
waived. Section 63-30-10(1) waives immunity for injuries 
proximately caused by the negligent acts or omissions of state 
employees, so immunity here is preliminarily waived. Step three 
requires a determination of whether there is an exception to the 
waiver. 
Section 63-30-10(1)(b) preserves immunity for injuries 
that arise out of a battery. This section was construed in 
Maddocks v. Salt Lake City Corp., 740 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1987). 
Maddocks involved a claim that a Salt Lake City police officer 
beat the plaintiff while two other officers negligently failed to 
intervene. Id. at 1338. The negligence claim against the City 
was dismissed by the trial court and the Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed. Id. at 1340. This Court ruled that the City was immune 
because the waiver of immunity for negligence was excepted by § 
63-30-10(1)(b). In affirming the dismissal this Court stated: 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 waives immunity 
"for injury proximately caused by a negligent 
act or omission an employee committed within 
the scope of employment." Immunity is, 
however, restored for negligent acts arising 
out of "assault, battery, false imprisonment 
[or] false arrest." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
10(1)(b) (1986). We think plaintiff's 
negligence claim arises out of battery and 
false imprisonment and is therefore not the 
sort of claim for which immunity has been 
waived. 
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Panel l a v . United S t a t e s , 2 Id F 2il h.
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is the first federal case to address the issue of whether the 
battery exception in the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) should be 
limited in application to the torts of government employees• The 
court held that the battery exception to waiver did not protect 
the government from torts of non-government employees. In so 
holding, the court stated: 
It is true that Section 2680(h), retaining 
immunity against claims arising out of 
assault and battery, can literally be read to 
apply to assaults committed by persons other 
than government employees. But we think such 
construction out of keeping with the rest of 
the act. 
Id. at 624. The Panella court's holding is founded upon its 
interpretation of other provisions in § 2680. According to the 
court, none of those provisions account for a situation in which 
the government could be held liable if the act were committed by 
someone other than a government employee. Id. at 625. Since the 
other provisions in § 2680 are limited in scope to the acts of 
government employees only, the assault and battery exception was 
given a similar construction. Id. 
In applying the Panella reasoning to the case at bar, 
it follows that § 63-30-10(1)(b) should not be construed as 
narrowly as its federal counterpart. According to Panella, the 
battery exception only applies to the torts of federal employees 
because its companion provisions are similarly limited. By 
contrast, the companion provisions of S 63-30-10(1)(b) are not as 
narrow as their federal counterparts. Other exceptions to the 
waiver of immunity protect government from the torts of non-
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 Ledfors argues that the Panella result should be applied 
without regard to the reasoning behind it. He bases this 
contention on a purported judicial rule that requires Utah's 
courts to follow federal decisions construing the battery-
exception in the FTCA. Although Ledfors cites no authority for 
this proposition, a rule akin to it is found in Frank v. State, 
613 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah 1980) and Little v. Utah State Division 
of Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983). Frank and Little 
exclusively address the discretionary function exception in § 63-
30-10(1) which is identical in a provision in the FTCA. Neither 
case discusses the battery exception which is at issue here. Any 
rule that requires adherence to federal decisions regarding the 
discretionary function issue should not apply to the Utah battery 
exception because it is intended to have a much broader 
application than its federal counterpart, See Poi nt T i 
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when a work release inmate murdered the plaintiff's mother. More 
recently, in Kirk v. State, 784 P.2d 1255, 1257 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989), the Utah Court of Appeals held that § 63-30-10(1) (j) 
barred a bailiff's negligence action against the State for 
injuries inflicted by a prison inmate. 
Since Utah's immunity exceptions are not limited to the 
acts of public employees, the Panella reasoning requires the 
battery exception to be similarly construed. This reasoning 
would immunize the government from injuries arising out of 
batteries regardless of the identity of the tort-feasor. 
Ledfors' authority actually warrants a finding of governmental 
immunity. 
In addition to Panella and its progeny, Ledfors would 
have this Court follow the reasoning of Doe v. United States, 838 
F.2d 220 (7th Circ. 1988). The holding of Doe is that where the 
government assumes a duty to a victim prior to an assault, and a 
breach of that duty leads to an assault, the injury does not 
arise out of the assault and is therefore not immune. Id. at 
223. Doe reflects the minority view, a substantial majority of 
federal courts having rejected it.5 More importantly, the Doe 
rule was rejected by a plurality of the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 55 (1985). Chief Justice Burger 
5
 Judge Manion's dissenting opinion in Doe pointed out that 
in adopting this view the 7th Circuit was in a distinct minority. 
With the exception of the Ninth Circuit, "all the circuits 
addressing this issue have held that § 2680(h) bars such claims." 
Id. at 226. See also Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 
1238, 1244 (1986), (categorizing this view as the minority 
position). 
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wrote: 
Respondent cannot avoid the reach of §2680 
by framing her complaint in terms of the 
negligent, failure to prevent the assault and 
battery. Section 2689(h) does not merely bar 
claims for assault and battery; in sweeping 
language it excludes any claim arising out 
assault or battery. We read this provision 
to cover claims like respondent's that sound 
in negligence but stem from a battery 
committed by a Government employee. Thus 
"the express words of the statute" bar 
respondent's claim against the Government. 
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6
 The reasoning of the Chief justice, that the sweeping 
iiising out of" language defeats the Doe rule, coincides with 
this Court's ruling that the phrase "arises out of" in § 63-30-10 
should be broadly construed. Gillman v. Dept. of Financial 
Instit. , 782 P. 2d 50fi 51? fl?tah 1989). 
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30-10(2)." IcL_ at 699. 
Connell presents factual circumstances similar to Doe. 
In Doe, the court ruled that where the Air Force undertook a duty 
to provide day-care to the children of servicemen, they assumed a 
duty of protection to the children. When two children were later 
sexually molested, the court refused to extend immunity under the 
"assault and battery" exception. The court held that where the 
government affirmatively assumes a duty to the victim prior to 
the assault, and a breach of that duty causes injury to the 
victim, the claim does not arise out of the assault. Such were 
precisely the circumstances in Connell; the clerk had a duty to 
keep accurate docket books before the plaintiff was arrested. 
The clerk's negligence caused the plaintiff to be improperly 
re-arrested. The Connell Court nevertheless held that the city 
was immune. Id. at 699. In this case, Connell demonstrates that 
the District's pre-existing duty does not eliminate its immunity. 
In addition to his unfounded reliance on Panella and 
Doe, Ledfors mistakenly cites Little v. Utah Division of Family 
Servs., 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983) as controlling. The Little Court 
ruled that where the government exercises no discretionary 
function it is held to ordinary negligence standards. Id. at 51. 
The Court did not hold that a pre-existing common law duty 
defeats governmental immunity, and it did not even discuss the 
battery exception to waiver. Little is tangential to the issue 
before the Court. 
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2. Statutory Construction 
In determining the meaning of S 63-30-10(l)(b), the 
Court's primary responsibility "is to give effect to the 
Legislature's underlying intent." Millet v. Clark Clinic Corp., 
609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980). This is done by giving effect to 
the literal meaning of the statutory language. West Jordan v. 
Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982). The West Jordan Court 
stated: 
We have also said that a statute should be applied 
according to its literal wording unless it is 
unreasonably confused or inoperable. We must assume 
that each term in the statute was used advisedly by the 
Legislature and that each should be interpreted and 
applied according to its usually acceptable meaning. 
Where the ordinary meaning of the terms results in an 
application that is neither unreasonably confused, 
inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction to the express 
purpose of the statute, it is not the duty of this 
Court to assess the wisdom of the statutory scheme. 
Id. at 446. (quoting Gord v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah 2d 138, 434 
P.2d 449 (1976)). 
The District's construction of the statute at issue is 
neither confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction to the 
express purpose of the Immunity Act. It preserves immunity in 
negligence actions where the plaintiff's injuries arise out of 
the commission of a battery. There is nothing in the language of 
the statute that limits its application to torts committed by 
government employees. There is nothing in the Act that would 
suggest such a limitation. In fact, other exceptions to waiver 
demonstrate that the Legislature intends that the government be 
immune in cases where non-government employees commit torts. 
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This Court should give effect to the plain meaning of § 63-30-
10(1)(b) and apply it to batteries committed by any person. Such 
a construction is consistent with this Court's broad 
interpretation of the "arises out of" language in the context of 
companion subsections of S 63-30-10. Gillman, 782 P.2d at 512. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing reasoning, the lower court's 
dismissal should be affirmed. 
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